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1 SUMMARY 
This module illustrates how Crossing Generalised Lorenz (GL) curves can be used to 
identify the best income distribution on social welfare grounds within a set of 
alternative income distributions generated by different policy options.  
 
It starts by illustrating two alternative income distributions resulting from policy 
changes that lead to income increases for some individuals and decreases for others. GL 
curves are then calculated for the alternative distributions to rank them on welfare 
grounds on the basis of Shorrocks’ Theorem. After observing that Shorrocks’ Theorem 
is not applicable, because GL curves cross once, necessary additional conditions, such 
as restrictions on the features of the Social Welfare Function (SWF) and the shape of 
income distributions, are set and discussed. Subsequently, a step-by-step procedure to 
use GL curves to infer welfare judgments when GL cross once, is provided and 
illustrated with some simple numerical examples. 
2 INTRODUCTION 
This module belongs to a set of modules which discuss how to rank different income 
distributions on welfare grounds that are generated by alternative policy options, such 
as: private investment support, input subsidies, output protection. this module, is useful 
in situations where the analyst has to provide information about the likely impact of a 
policy measure such as a tax/benefit reform, infrastructural investment policy, a specific 
sectoral or sub-sectoral policy on the distribution of income, more specifically, to 
answer policy questions such as whether the policy measure under investigation leads to 
a social welfare improvement or not. 
 
Objectives  
The specific  objective of this module is to illustrate how GL curves can be used to rank 
income distributions on welfare grounds even if the GL curves of the two distributions  
cross each other once. The user will learn how to make use of Generalised Lorenz 
dominance with crossing GL curves, to draw conclusions on the most preferred income 
distribution within a set of possible income distributions generated by alternative policy 
options. He will also learn more about the limitations of GL curves for welfare 
considerations.  
 
Target audience 
This module targets different categories of users in different contexts, for example:  
 trainers can use this module in capacity development activities e.g. to teach policy 
analysts how to use household data in policy work;  
 policy analysts can use this module as reference material when carrying out their 
on-the-job tasks;  
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 lecturers in academic courses can use this material to support under-graduate 
courses in welfare economics, economic policy, development economics and related 
fields;  
 other users, such as  NGOs, political parties, professional organizations or  
consulting firms that are willing to enhance their expertise in analyzing welfare 
impacts of policies by means of analyzing changes in income distributions. 
 
Required background  
The trainer is strongly recommended to verify the suitability of the trainees’  
background, in particular, the trainees must be familiar with:  
 Concepts of policy impact simulations.  
 Concepts of income distribution.   
 Concepts and technicalities of Lorenz curves and generalized Lorenz curves.  
 Concepts of social welfare and social welfare functions. 
 
If this background is weak or missing, the trainer may consider delivering other 
modules beforehand, as highlighted in the introduction. Trainees should also know basic 
concepts of welfare economics, statistics, elementary mathematics and, possibly, basic 
principles of calculus.  
 
To find relevant materials in these areas, the reader can follow the links included in the 
text to other EASYPol modules or  references1
3 CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
. A set of useful links to related 
EASYPol modules is provided in a section at the end of the document. 
This section sets the problem of crossing GL curves and presents the conceptual 
background required  to use GL curves for welfare ranking when curves cross each 
other once, i.e. when Shorrocks’ Theorem is not applicable.  
 
The core of this section is the discussion on:  
 the restrictions to be imposed on the SWF when GL curves cross once in order to 
obtain unanimous judgments on the ranking of income distributions on welfare 
grounds (the so-called “principle of diminishing transfers”); 
 the conditions about the variances of the distributions to be compared (the 
“variance” condition) when two distributions have the same mean income; 
 the need to rule out some “extreme” SWF that bend toward inequality neutrality to 
get a unanimous consensus when comparing a more egalitarian distribution with a 
                                                 
1 EASYPol  hyperlinks are shown in blue, as follows:  
a) training paths are shown in underlined bold font;  
b) other EASYPol modules or complementary EASYPol materials are in bold underlined italics;  
c)  links to the glossary are in bold; and  
d)  external links are in italics 
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 lower mean income, or when comparing a less egalitarian distribution with a higher 
mean income  (Rawlsian toward Utilitarian preferences); 
 the “mean-variance” conditions to select the “extreme” SWF to be ruled out in such 
cases.  
3.1 Setting the problem:  crossing of GL curves 
In the module Ranking income distributions with Generalised Lorenz curves, there is a 
case here two GL curves cross each other. For ease of reference, you will find this 
example reported here below in Table 1 and Figure 1, respectively.  
 
Distribution I is the result of a policy, the net impact of which results in mixed shifts of 
income from richer to poorer, i.e. one income unit from individual 3 to individual 1, and 
from poorer to richer, i.e. one unit of income from individual 4 to individual 5.  
 
Table 1 - Mixed transfers from richer to poorer and from poorer to richer: a 
case of crossing GL curves 
Distribution A Distribution I
Cum.share of p Income (Y) Cum.share Y% Cum.aver.Y Income (Y) Cum.sh.Y% Cum.aver.Y Diff.cum.
Individuals (hor.axis L/GL) (vert.axis of L) (vert.axis GL) (vert.axis of L) (vert.axis GL) aver.Y I-A
(a) (b) ( c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)
1 20.0% 3 6.7% 0.6 4 8.9% 0.8 0.2
2 40.0% 6 20.0% 1.8 6 22.2% 2.0 0.2
3 60.0% 9 40.0% 3.6 8 40.0% 3.6 0.0
4 80.0% 12 66.7% 6.0 11 64.4% 5.8 -0.2
5 100.0% 15 100.0% 9.0 16 100.0% 9.0 0.0
Total income 45.0 45.0
Mean income 9.0 9.0
 I  L dominates A for the first 60% of the 
population  but A  L dominates I for greater 
cumulated shares of the population, i.e. I presents 
lower cumulated shares of income in the lower 
part of the distribution and higher cumulated 
shares in the higher part of the distribution. 
Therefore, L curves cross. 
Note that the GL do cross because the difference 
between the ordinates of I and A are positive in 
the lower part of the curves and negative in the 
upper part.
 
 
In this case, L curves cross, as is apparent from Figure 1a (and columns d and g) and 
also GL curves cross. This is not  surprising indeed, because distributions A and I have 
the same mean income2
 
. Note that the Shorrocks’ Theorem presented in the above-
mentioned module cannot be applied to rank the two income distributions on welfare 
grounds,  because it requires that the GL curves of one distribution dominate the GL 
curves of the other. So far, no conclusive judgement can be reached. 
                                                 
2 Remember, from EASYpol Module 002: Social Welfare Analysis of Income Distributions:  
Ranking Income Distributions with Generalised Lorenz Curves,  that when two distributions have 
the same mean, the GL curves are simply up-scaled versions of the Lorenz curves. 
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Figures 1a and 1b - Mixed transfers from richer to poorer and poorer to 
richer: a case of crossing GL curves  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to make a conclusive welfare judgment for this case, the decision-maker has to  
trade off  welfare improvements that occur both in the lower and upper parts of the 
distribution (individuals 1 and 5 are better off in I than in A) with worsening welfare in 
the central part of the distribution (individuals 3 and 4 are worse off in I than in A). 
More specifically, the decision-maker has to weigh the “inequality-reducing” policy 
impact, that brings an individual well below the mean income (individual 1) and, 
therefore, closer to the mean income by transferring income to him/her from a better-off 
individual (individual 3), against the “inequality-increasing” policy impact, that pushes 
an individual even further above the mean income (individual 5) by transferring income 
to him from a worse-off individual (individual 4). 
3.2 GL curves crossing once: Rawlsian versus utilitarian 
preferences  
In the example reported above, crossing GL curves occurred with equal mean income 
distributions. In general, however, when GL curves cross once, two possible cases arise: 
i) mean incomes are equal; ii) mean incomes are different. 
 
The two cases are illustrated in Figure 2, graphs a) and  b), below: 
 
Figure 2 - GL curves crossing once: the two possible cases: 
 
a) Distributions with equal means µ b) Distributions with different means µ  
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In the above Figure, GL curves for three distributions A, B, and C, and pair wise 
comparisons are illustrated. The vertical axis illustrates income y and the horizontal axis 
illustrates the proportion of population p. Note that for distribution A in graph 2a, GL 
curves dominate distribution B in the lower part, but GL curves are dominated by B in 
the upper part. On the other hand, the two distributions have the same mean income3. 
Whereas, in graph 2b, GL curves dominate distribution B in the lower part, but 
distribution C ends up with a lower mean4
The polar concepts of Utilitarian and Rawlsian welfare preferences, are useful here to 
highlight where and how trade offs between equity and efficiency are reported by 
crossing GL curves:  
.  
 
Utilitarian preferences amount to inequality neutrality, i.e., only the mean income 
matters. In terms of GL curves, it means that Utilitarians look at the end-point of the 
distributions: which one is higher and thus preferred. In Figure 2a, above, distributions 
A and B would be indifferent from a utilitarian point of view. Whereas, in graph 2b, 
Utilitarians would definitely prefer B to C, because the average income is greater.  
 
Rawlsian preferences amount to infinite inequality aversion, i.e. only the poorest 
income matters. In terms of GL curves, it means that Rawlsians look at the starting 
point of the income distribution. The distribution whose GL curve dominates the lowest 
incomes, would be preferred. In Figure 2a and 2b respectively, Rawlsians would 
definitely prefer  A to B and C to B.  
 
Therefore, to compare the two curves in Figure 2a, you would have to focus only on 
equity, because they are equivalent on efficiency grounds. Rawlsians and Utilitarians 
would both agree to choose distribution A and discard distribution B. On the other hand, 
non-extreme decision-makers may have different points of view about which 
distribution to choose. Restrictions and conditions will be needed on the SWF and on 
the shape of the distributions. 
 
To compare the two curves in Figure 2b, i.e. where distributions have different means, it 
is not possible to achieve a unanimous consensus about the “best” distribution, because 
Rawlsians will always oppose Utilitarians. In such cases, “extreme Utilitarians” will 
have to be ruled out in order to achieve a unanimous consensus on the “best” 
distribution among all the other decision-makers. 
3.3  The principle of “diminishing transfers” 
However as specified in the module  Ranking income distributions with Lorenz curves, 
the features of the preferences of the decision-maker embodied in the SWF, i.e. the fact 
that, other things being equal, the decision-maker is an “income-seeker” and inequality-
                                                 
3 This is the same case as presented in  Figure 1, above. 
4 Note that for the case where, for example, distribution A, GL dominates distribution B for lower 
incomes, i.e. A crosses B from above,  GL curves cross once and A has a higher mean than B, this is 
simply not possible. If  the end point of A, i.e. the mean income, were superior to that of B, the GL curves 
would need to cross each other at least twice 
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averse, thus  favours transfers from richer to poorer and dislikes transfers from poorer to 
richer individuals, do not convey any insight on how he/she would trade off inequality 
increasing impacts versus inequality decreasing impacts included in the same “policy 
package”. Distribution I would be preferred to A, only if the gain in social welfare, 
obtained by transferring income to the poorer, should more than compensate the loss in 
social welfare incurred by transferring income to the richer. Broadly speaking,  if the 
decision-maker “likes reducing inequality to the advantage of the poorer more than he 
dislikes increasing inequality to the advantage of the richer”, he would probably prefer 
distribution I to A. More formally, a pre-condition for the decision-maker to prefer I to 
A is that, other things being equal, he/she accepts the so called principle of diminishing 
transfers, i.e. the third derivative of the SWF has to be positive, as explained in the 
section below. 
 
The principle of diminishing transfers5
 
 states that the increase in the social welfare 
generated by a transfer of a given amount of income from a richer to a poorer 
individual, both of whom are in the lower part of the distribution, increases the social 
welfare more than a transfer of the same amount from a richer to a poorer individual, 
both of whom are in the upper part of the distribution.   
The SWF is: 
 
i) Increasing in income. The function w=w(y) is such that, other things being equal, an 
increase of the income of any individual i, at any income level,  must lead to a positive 
variation of welfare. In Figure 3, below, where a welfare function is illustrated in the 
two dimensional space to highlight the contribution to the social welfare of the ith 
income (i.e. all other things being equal), for example: income increases ∆y at the 
income levels y1  and y3, lead to positive variations of welfare ∆w1 and ∆w3, 
respectively6
0>
∂
∂
iy
w
. Mathematically, this property is reflected by the positive first derivative 
of the welfare function: . 
 
ii) Reflecting inequality-aversion (principle of transfers). The function w=w(y) is 
such that, other things being equal, an increase ∆y of a richer individual’s income 
generates a lower welfare variation than the same increase ∆y for a poorer individual.  In 
Figure 3, below, for example, an income increase ∆y at income level y3 generates a 
lower welfare increase ∆w3 than the welfare increase ∆w1 generated by the income 
increase ∆y at the income level y1 7
                                                 
5 To better understand this principle and to see how it is reflected in the mathematical properties of the 
SWF, it is worth recalling the assumptions about the SWF provided in EASYPol Module 001: 
: 
Social  
Welfare Analysis of Income Distributions: Ranking Income Distributions with Lorenz Curves. 
and analyzing the principle of diminishing transfers in that context.   
6 Similarly,  decreases in income -∆y  at income  levels y2  and y4 lead to negative variations of welfare, -
∆w2 and -∆w4 respectively. 
7 Similarly, decreases in income -∆y  at income  levels y2  and y4 generate negative variations of welfare -
∆w2 and - ∆w4 respectively, such that  -∆w2 < -∆w4  -i.e. ∆w2 > ∆w4 . 
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13 ww ∆<∆  
 
Therefore, the welfare variation decreases as income increases. Or, also: 
0)( 13 <∆−∆ ww  
 
The term in brackets can be considered the  “variation of the variation of welfare” as 
negative income increases. Mathematically, for infinitesimal changes of y, i.e. for ∆y → 
0 this property is reflected by the negative second derivative of the welfare function: 
0
2
2
<
∂
∂
iy
w
. 
 
Figure 3 - The principle of diminishing transfers  
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iii) Accepting the principle of diminishing transfers. The function w=w(y) is such 
that it satisfies the principle of diminishing transfers if, for small transfers of income ∆y,  
the gain in welfare, due to a transfer of income from richer to poorer individuals in the 
lower part of the distribution, say from y2  to y1 (as indicated by the arrows),  is greater 
than the gain in welfare due to a transfer of income from richer to poorer individuals in 
the upper part of the distribution, say  from y4  to y3 .  
 
In other words, we can deduce from Figure 3, that this amounts to: 
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This implies that, after rearranging the equation: )()( 1234 wwww ∆−∆>∆−∆  
 
i.e the variation of the variation of income increases as income increases8
 
. 
or also:  0)()( 1234 >∆−∆−∆−∆ wwww  
 
i.e the variation of the “variation of the variation” of welfare is positive due to small 
changes of income. In mathematical terms, for infinitesimal changes of y, i.e. for ∆y → 
0, this property is reflected by the positive third derivative of the welfare function: 
03
3
>
∂
∂
iy
w
.  
 
Similarly, with reference to Figure 3, above, for such decision-makers, an increase in 
the social welfare generated by a transfer of a given amount of income from a richer to 
poorer individual, both in the lower part of the distribution, more than offsets the loss of 
welfare generated by the transfer of the same amount from a poorer to a richer 
individual, both in the upper part of the distribution. 
3.4 Requirements  for ranking  distributions if GL curves cross 
once 
The first consequence for welfare rankings when GL curves cross, as in the above case, 
is that unanimous welfare prescriptions can no longer be achieved for all SWF, such 
that: 0>∂
∂
iy
w
and 02
2
<
∂
∂
iy
w
. It can be shown, however9
03
3
>
∂
∂
iy
w
, that welfare prescriptions are 
possible in some cases when GL curves cross, but only for those SWF satisfying the 
“principle of diminishing transfers” i.e. those SWF that have the third derivative with 
respect to individual incomes greater than zero: .  
 
                                                 
8 Note that the two equations in brackets are both negative, but the equation on the left  is  “less negative” 
than the one on the right.  
9 Mathematical proof that restrictions on the SWF and conditions on the means and variances of the 
distributions, are  required  when GL curves cross, are sketched out  in Lambert, 1993, p. 75. 
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Box 1 - The principle of diminishing transfers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We can also demonstrate that, in addition to the above mentioned restrictions on the 
SWF, further requirements have to be fulfilled in order to use GL curves for ranking 
distributions.  
 
These requirements depend on the relationship between the mean incomes of the 
distributions to be compared, as discussed in section 3.2., above, i.e. whether mean 
incomes are equal or different. 
 
Let us start with the first case: GL CURVES CROSS ONCE AND MEAN INCOMES ARE 
EQUAL10
 
. Here, Utilitarian SWFs are indifferent as mean incomes are equal. Rawlsian 
SWFs definitely prefer income distributions that dominate the lower part of the graph. 
But to have unanimous welfare prescriptions on the dominating distribution in the lower 
part of the graph, the following condition must be satisfied: 
Box 2 - Additional requirements when distributions have equal mean 
incomes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Let us now consider the second case: GL CURVES CROSS ONCE AND MEAN INCOMES ARE 
UNEQUAL. In this case, to have unanimous welfare prescriptions on the dominating 
distribution in the lower part, the following condition must be satisfied: 
 
                                                 
10 As mean incomes are equal, this case implies that standard Lorenz curves cross, otherwise welfare 
rankings could be made applying Atkinson’s Theorem as presented in EASYPol Module 001: Social  
Welfare Analysis of Income Distributions: Ranking Income Distributions with Lorenz Curves. 
Preliminary requirement: the SWF must reflect the “principle of diminishing 
transfers” 
 
When GL curves cross, unanimous welfare prescriptions can in some cases be 
obtained by using GL curves, only if we restrict the class of admissible SWF to 
those having: 
0>
∂
∂
iy
w
, 02
2
<
∂
∂
iy
w
and 03
3
>
∂
∂
iy
w
 
If two income distributions Y and X have the same mean and the following two 
conditions are verified: 
a) the GL curve of Y crosses the GL curve of X from above; and 
b) the variance of Y is lower than the variance of X ( 22 XY σσ ≤ ) – (VARIANCE 
CONDITION); 
 
then Y would be preferred by all SWF satisfying the “principle of diminishing 
transfers”. 
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Box 3 - Additional requirements when distributions have different mean 
incomes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hence, in both cases of GL curves crossing once, there is either a variance or a mean-
variance condition to satisfy. However when mean incomes are unequal, as in this last 
case the mean-variance condition is more stringent because the variance of Y must be 
sufficiently less than the variance of X, not only just less, as the variance condition 
would prescribe. 
 
If the variance condition or the mean-variance condition do not hold, the case of 
crossing GL  curves cannot be solved, and welfare rankings are simply not possible.  
 
When the mean-variance condition holds, however, we can go a step further to measure 
the robustness of the welfare ranking to the degree of inequality-aversion. It can be 
demonstrated that from the mean-variance condition it is indeed possible to calculate the 
lower limit of inequality-aversion b, below which welfare prescriptions obtained by GL 
ranking no longer hold.  
The relevant expression is: 
 
   ( )( ) ( )( )yxzyx
yxzb
YX −−−−σ−σ
−
=
222
 
 
where symbols have the usual meaning. For example, if b=2, all decision-makers whose 
SWF includes an inequality-aversion parameter greater than 2 will agree on the result. 
Those with a lower inequality aversion (e.g. the Utilitarians) may not agree on the 
welfare ranking. Calculating the lower limit is very useful to understand the robustness 
of the ranking in terms of consensus across different decision makers with different 
degrees of inequality aversion. 
If these three conditions are verified:  
a) the GL curve of an income distribution Y crosses the GL curve of an income 
distribution X from above;  
b) the mean income of Y is lower than the mean income of X ( )xy < ; and 
c) ( )( )yxzyxXY −−−−< 222 σσ , where z is the maximum income of the two 
distributions (MEAN-VARIANCE CONDITION); 
 
then Y would be preferred by all SWF  satisfying. the “Principle of Diminishing 
Transfers”. 
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4 A STEP-BY-STEP PROCEDURE FOR WELFARE RANKINGS IF GL 
CURVES CROSS ONCE 
The flowchart in Figure 4, below, illustrates the step-by-step procedure for welfare 
rankings of two income distributions when their GL curves cross once11
 
. In actual fact, 
Steps 1 to 6 are aimed at verifying whether welfare rankings can be solved with either 
Lorenz domination or with GL domination. If this is not possible because the GL curves 
cross each other once, the conditions reported in the section above need to be checked. 
Step 7 first requires you to calculate the variance of each income distribution. then, in 
step 8, the mean of the two distributions is checked. If the two distributions have equal 
mean incomes steps 9a to 11a will follow, whereas, if the two distributions have 
different mean incomes, steps 9b to 11b will follow.  
If GL curves cross once and mean incomes of the two distributions are equal,  Step 9a, 
requires that the variance condition be verified. Then step 10a requires that you check 
which of the two GL curves crosses the other from above. In step 11a conclusions are 
drawn: if GL(Y) crosses GL(X) once from above and, at the same time, the Y variance 
is lower than the X variance, then income distribution Y will be socially preferred to X 
by all SWFs satisfying the “principle of diminishing transfers”. 
 
If GL curves cross once and mean incomes of the two distributions are different, the 
mean-variance condition needs to be checked (Step 9b). Then step 10b requires to check 
which of the two GL curves crosses the other from above. In step 11b Conclusions are 
drawn: if a) the mean-variance condition is satisfied for Y; and b)  GL(Y) crosses 
GL(X) from above, then the Y income distribution is socially preferred to X for all SWF 
satisfying the “principle of diminishing transfers”. 
 
                                                 
11 If  multiple crossing of GL occur, sub-populations need to be analysed. Multiple crossings of GL 
curves however are quite infrequent in real cases. For the analysis of these cases  refer to, e.g. Lambert, 
1993, pp. 78 to 80.  
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Figure 4 - Flowchart for a step-by step procedure for welfare rankings 
when GL curves cross once 
 
 STEP  OPERATIONAL CONTENT  
      1  Sort income distributions Y and X by income level  
      2  Check whether income distributions have different 
mean incomes 
 
      3  Build Lorenz curves for each distribution  
      4  Verify that either Lorenz curves cross or that the 
dominating distribution has a lower mean (no 
applicability of Atkinson’s Theorem) 
 
      5  Build GL curves  
      6  Verify that GL curves cross (no GL dominance, i.e., no 
applicability of Shorrocks’ Theorem 
 
      7  Calculate the variance of the two  
      8    
     
     
STEP  OPERATIONAL 
CONTENT 
 STEP  OPERATIONAL 
CONTENT 
       
9a  Check the variance 
condition 
 9b  Check the mean-
variance condition 
       
10a  Check whether the 
GL of the distirbution 
with lower variance 
corsses from above 
 10b  If 9b is verified for one 
distribution, check 
whether its GL crosses 
from above the other GL 
       
11a  Draw conclusions:  
if 10a is verified for 
one distribution, that 
one is better for all 
SWFs approving 
diminishing transfers 
 11b  Draw conclusions: 
if 10b is verified for one 
distribution, that one is 
better for all SWFs 
approving diminishing 
transfers 
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5 EXAMPLES: RANKING DISTRIBUTIONS WHEN GL CURVES 
CROSS ONCE 
5.1  Distributions with equal mean income  
The case where two income distributions, A and I, with the same mean income are 
compared, was discussed in section 3.1 and illustrated in Table 1 and Figure 1, above. 
Figure 1a depicts what Lorenz curves look like in this case12
 
. Since Lorenz curves cross, 
GL curves are built and illustrated in Figure 1b. Apparently, also GL curves cross. 
Hence, in this case, you need to calculate the variance of income distributions.  
 The variance of income distribution A is 22.50 
 The variance of distribution I is 22.00. 
 
Therefore, considering that: 
 the GL curve of distribution I crosses over the top of  the A GL curve,  
 distribution I has lower variance than A. 
 
I is welfare-superior to A according to all decision-makers whose SWF satisfies the 
principle of diminishing transfers. 
5.2  Distributions with a different mean income  
On the other hand, Table 3, below, illustrates a case where GL curves cross once and 
mean incomes are unequal. Distribution L is the result of a policy which, starting from 
distribution A, leads to an income transfer from the middle of the distribution to the 
poorer area, thus bringing a net income decrease for the richer. This last impact 
decreases the mean income of L with respect to A, as indicated in the last row of 
columns (c) and (f). 
 
                                                 
12 Since income distributions have an equal mean, the only case in which Lorenz curves cannot rank 
income distributions is when they cross. Refer to EASYPol Module 001: Social  Welfare Analysis of 
Income Distributions: Ranking Income Distributions with Lorenz Curves,  where the application 
of Atkinson’s Theorem is presented. 
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Table 3 - More equitable but lower mean distribution: GL curves crossing 
once  
 
Distribution A Distribution L
Cum.share of p Income (Y) Cum.share Y% Cum.aver.Y Income (Y) Cum.sh.Y% Cum.aver.Y Diff.cum.
Individuals (hor.axis L/GL) (vert.axis of L) (vert.axis GL) (vert.axis of L) (vert.axis GL) aver.Y L-A
(a) (b) ( c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)
1 20.0% 3 6.7% 0.6 4 9.3% 0.8 0.2
2 40.0% 6 20.0% 1.8 6 23.3% 2.0 0.2
3 60.0% 9 40.0% 3.6 8 41.9% 3.6 0.0
4 80.0% 12 66.7% 6.0 12 69.8% 6.0 0.0
5 100.0% 15 100.0% 9.0 13 100.0% 8.6 -0.4
Total income 45.0 43.0
Mean income 9.0 8.6
L dominates A, i.e.  A presents lower 
cumulated shares of income everywhere, but 
L has lower mean, so the Atckinson's theorem 
cannot be applied.
Note that the GL do cross because the difference 
between the ordinates of L and A are positive in the 
lower part of the curves and negative in the upper part. 
In particular, at thendpoint of the curve, A GL 
dominates L (A has higher mean income).  
 
 
Now, income distribution L has a lower mean income, but also has a dominating Lorenz 
curve, as Figure 5a, below, shows. 
 
In this case, GL curves are needed and also the mean-variance condition is required. In 
Figure 5b you can see that L crosses A towards the top of the curve. To be welfare-
superior, the variance of L has to be lower than the threshold set by the mean variance 
condition, i.e. lower than 19.14.  
 
The variance of Y is actually 14.80, thus implying that the preferred distribution is L  
and not A on the basis of welfare grounds as all SWF satisfy the following factors 
W’>0, W’’<0 and W’’’>0. 
 
Figures 5a and 5b - Crossing GL curves with different mean incomes 
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6 CONCLUSION 
To conclude, it is worth summarising the main results achieved so far. The basic result 
is that Lorenz curves and Generalised Lorenz curves are a powerful tool for welfare 
ranking of different income distributions. However, unlike the case of the complete 
specification of a SWF, these tools may give a «partial ordering», as there might be 
cases where required conditions for welfare ranking are not met . 
 
Table 4, below, summarizes all results achieved so far, highlighting all outcomes 
deriving from the combination of the type of relation between curves and mean incomes 
of the distribution observed. 
 
 
Table 4 - Distributional dominance and welfare rankings 
 
 
 
 
It is worth noting again three important aspects:  
 GL curves are required when either Lorenz curves cross or the dominating 
distribution has the lower mean (cases 3 and 4). 
 When GL curves cross once, additional restrictions on the form of the SWF W (i.e. 
its third derivative W’’’>0) are required in any case (cases 8 and 9). 
 When GL curves cross, welfare rankings are possible only if either the variance or 
the mean-variance conditions are satisfied, depending on the relation between mean 
incomes. 
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7 READERS’ NOTES  
7.1 Time requirements 
The delivery of this module and related discussion may take two to three hours to an 
audience already familiar with concepts of policy, policy impact simulations, income 
and income distributions, Lorenz curves, social welfare and Social Welfare Functions. 
7.2 Frequently asked questions 
Frequently asked questions are, for example, the following:  
 What is the meaning and role of the preferences of the decision-maker? i.e., 
what does it mean that the decision-maker is “inequality-averse” and an income-
seeker? It is important in these cases to refer to the shape of the welfare function 
imposed by the restrictions on its first and second derivatives.  
 How is the “with policy” income distribution generated? Selected trainees, not 
familiar with how to build policy scenarios may not understand how, in practical 
cases, the “with policy” income distribution is generated, i.e., how to logically link 
the policy proposal to the new  income distribution. In addition, slightly more 
complex exercises than the examples provided in the module with real data should 
be prepared and carried out.  
7.3 Complementary capacity building materials  
The trainer may also consider the opportunity to present the relevant segment of the  
country case study based on real data: Inequality and poverty impacts of selected 
agricultural policies: the case of Armenia. 
7.4 EASYPol links  
This module belongs to a set of modules which discuss how to provide normative 
prescriptions when confronting alternative income distributions, i.e. how to identify the 
best income distribution in terms of social welfare, in a set of alternative income 
distributions.  It is part of the modules composing a training path addressing Analysis 
and monitoring of socio-economic impacts of policies. 
 
The following EASYPOL modules form a set of materials logically preceding the 
current module, which can be used to strengthen the user’s background: 
 EASYPol Module 000: Charting Income Inequality: The Lorenz Curve.  
 EASYPol Module 001: Social  Welfare Analysis of Income Distributions: 
Ranking Income Distributions with Lorenz Curves  
 EASYPol Module 002: Social Welfare Analysis of Income Distributions: 
Ranking Income Distribution with Generalised Lorenz Curves.  
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A case study presenting the use of crossing Generalised Lorenz curves to rank income 
distributions in the context an agricultural policy impact simulation exercise with real 
data is reported in the EASYPol Module 042: Inequality and Poverty Impacts of 
Selected Agricultural Policies: The Case of Paraguay.. 
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